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This paper explores the eﬀect of aggregate mortality risk on thepricing of annuities. It uses
a two-period model; in the second period people face a constant but intiially unknown risk of
death. Old people can either carry the aggregat emortlaity risk for themselves or buy annuities
which are sold by young people. A market-clearing price for such annuties is established. It is
found that old people would, given the choice, decide to carry a considerable part of aggregate
mortality risk for themselves.
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11 Introduction
Many of the issues associated with annuity markets have been well-researched in recent years, as
reported in the comprehensive survey by Davidoﬀ, Brown, and Diamond (2005). Much of this
research has focussed upon the merits of conventional annuities, with the general ﬁnding that there
is likely to be a substantial role for annuitisation even in context of heterogeneous preferences for
investment, the time stream of consumption, and bequests. In contrast, very little work has been
conducted to understand the workings of conventional annuities markets with regard to aggregate
mortality risk. This is surprising, given the role played by mortality risk in the a priori justiﬁcation
for conventional annuities. Here, we suggest an appropriate economic model for pricing conventional
annuities, and use the model to project plausible values for the annuity risk premium attributable
to uncertainty regarding individual and cohort speciﬁc life expectancy.
To clarify terms, aggregate mortality risk refers to the uncertainty that is associated with the
average longevity of a birth cohort. Individual mortality risk, by contrast, is the uncertainty of
the precise time of death of an individual, relative to their respective birth cohort. Individuals
from a given birth cohort could protect themselves against individual mortality risk through the
use of a mortality-adjusted annuity, which pays an annual dividend that depends upon the realised
mortality rate of the cohort1. Purchasers of such a mortality-adjusted annuity will, nevertheless
remain exposed to income uncertainty to the extent that cohort mortality is uncertain. This diﬀers
from a conventional life annuity, which pays a guaranteed income to purchasers until death.2
The topic of aggregate mortality uncertainty was not discussed in the survey by Davidoﬀ, Brown,
and Diamond (2005). While Bohn (2005) does air the question of uncertain longevity, he limits
himself to scenario analysis – the eﬀect of a permanent increase in longevity during retirement – and
does not address the question of risk in its more conventional sense. The problem is that the true
mortality rate of any particular cohort is known only ex post. When an insurance company sells an
annuity it contracts to pay a regular income calculated on the basis of a forecast of the mortality
rate. Like any forecast, projections of mortality rates are subject to error, and any insurance
1Conceptually a mortality-adjusted annuity is not very diﬀerent from a tontine. However historically tontines
have operated by pooling the contributions of the participants with the last survivor receiving the whole amount and
the other participants receiving nothing.
2We are not aware of any contemporary sellers of mortality-adjusted annuities in the United Kingdom but it is
likely that there would be beneﬁts to ﬁlling this gap in ﬁnancial markets; certainly, if the premium associated with
aggregate mortality risk is large, then one might expect that annuitants would value the opportunity to carry at least
some of the aggregate mortality risk themselves. Annuities are available which invest the funds in the stock market
and which therefore pay out on a with proﬁts basis; typically with these the annuitants do carry aggegate mortality
risk.
2company selling conventional annuities therefore carries mortality risk. Casual discussion in the
United Kingdom has suggested that this risk may be substantial. Banks and Blundell (2005) make
the point that “unanticipated increases in longevity put pressure on all forms of pension systems”
although they do not oﬀer any view on the scale of this pressure3. Hardy (2005) states that “Even
actuaries recognize that longer life is a good thing – but, to the extent that it is unanticipated,
it is also an enormous problem for the managers of annuity portfolios”, with the implication that
an annuitant should expect to pay a substantial risk premium on an annuity. On the other hand
studies such as Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) argue that, after allowing for adverse selection,
annuity pricing is close to actuarially fair before making any allowance for a risk premium. This
last observation implies that either the risk premium cannot be very large or that, once it is taken
into account, conventional annuities are substantially mis-priced.
One clue to the pricing of mortality risk might be oﬀered by ﬁnancial markets. In November 2004
the European Investment Bank (EIB) issued a mortality bond following an earlier issue in December
2003 by the insurance company Swiss Re. A mortality bond is a loan stock whose payout depends
on the mortality rate of a speciﬁc cohort and in the case of the EIB issue, the mortality of the cohort
of men in the United Kingdom aged 65 in 2003. The pay-out received by purchasers of the stock
increases proportionately to the longevity of the deﬁned cohort, thus providing a hedge against
aggregate mortality risk. Friedberg and Webb (????) explore the pricing of the EIB mortality bond
in the context of the consumption capital asset pricing model (CCAPM). Despite their observation
that conventional annuities expose insurance companies to “substantial risk”, they ﬁnd on the basis
of their model that the cost of hedging aggregate mortality risk should be very low.
The CCAPM prices assets taking into account correlations between associated investment re-
turns and consumption needs. This is an appealing approach for pricing conventional annuities as it
reﬂects the insurance motive. The CCAPM does not, however, provide an explanation of pricing in
terms of demand and supply. Furthermore, the assumption of an inﬁnitely lived representative con-
sumer by the CCAPM sits uncomfortably alongside the uncertain mortality that inﬂuences demand
for conventional annuities in practice.4
Annuities represent a transaction, where one group of consumers (the elderly) divest themselves
of their aggregate mortality risk by purchasing insurance from another group (the young). In this
3In the United Kingdom there is a separate problem that mortality rates have been systematically over-predicted
by the Government Actuary. Here, however, we focus on shocks relative to unbaised forecasts.
4The model could be extended to address aggregate mortality risk using the approach suggested by Yaari (1965)
in which all consumers have the same mortality rate independent of their age and where, therefore, the notion of a
representative consumer can be retained, as Blanchard (1985) does in his analysis of ﬁscal policy with ﬁnite horizons.
3paper we consequently explore the pricing of aggregate mortality risk in an overlapping-generations
model. In the model young people have no risk of death but, beyond a threshold age when they
become old, they face a constant risk of death. Old people buy conventional annuities from young
people (or from insurance companies whose shares are owned by young people) at a price which
balances the willingness of the young to carry aggregate mortality risk with the desire of the old to
divest themselves of it. The old and the young have diﬀerent attitudes to the mortality risk of the
old because they are of diﬀerent ages; young people can adjust their consumption while still young
in response to the gains or losses that they experience from carrying the mortality risk of the old.
The fact that diﬀerent generations are aﬀected diﬀerently by shocks to the mortality rate of any
particular cohort makes transactions in mortality risk possible.
We begin by discussing the way in which mortality rates for men have changed in the last
sixty years or so. We proceed to set out a modelling framework to assess the impact of aggregate
mortality risk on the pricing of conventional annuities and we use this to assess the risk margins
which we might expect to observe. Finally we draw conclusions.
2 Mortality Risk and the Evolution of Mortality Rates in
the United Kingdom
A time-series econometrician might think that there are two separate issues present here. Systematic
under-prediction might be indicative of bias, while forecast errors arise simply because the future is
uncertain; with good forecasting methods, therefore, the bias present might therefore be eliminated.
Reality is less clear. The background to the forecasting error in the United Kingdom can be
seen in ﬁgures 1 and 2. These graphs show the logarithmic diﬀerences of decade average death rates
taken from the Human Mortality Database for the United Kingdom since 1930. The ﬁgures for
the decade starting in 2000 are calculated from mortality data for 2000-2003 and divided by 0.7 to
reﬂect the gap to the mid point of these to the mid-point of the 1990-99 decade is only 7 years. The
rates for the four age bands follow similar patterns with a structural break occurring by the 1980s
as a modest trend improvement became an accelerating trend. The sharpest improvements are with
the younger two age groups where the mortality rates are rather low anyway. Thus the impact of
these logarithmic changes on life expectancy at age sixty-ﬁve is not as substantial as a quick look
at the graph might suggest. For very old men the acceleration in the reduction in mortality is less
marked, as 2 shows.
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Figure 1: Decennial Changes in Log Mortality Rates: UK Men aged 65-84
currently in their seventies and early eighties experiencing much lower mortality rates than their
predecessors. However, it remains to be seen whether that will continue to be the case as they reach
extreme old age.
In forecasting mortality rates actuaries face the problem of deciding how long the rapid im-
provements shown in ﬁgure 1 will last- and the past pattern of mortality rates cannot be said to
oﬀer much of a guide to this; indeed it one looks further back- to 1840 the experience of the last
thirty years or so stands out even more markedly. Not surprisingly views are divided, with some
authors arguing that there is an upper limit to life expectancy5(Wilmoth and Horiuchi 1999)- with
the implication not only that the rate of reduction in mortality rates must eventually stop, but
that it must fall back towards zero, and other authors (Oeppen and Vaupel 2002) arguing that
there is no sign of a limit being reached and plenty of evidence of assumed limits being broken. Of
course the views need not be inconsistent; Oeppen and Vaubel are not arguing that life expectancy
5An upper limit to life expectancy does not imply an upper limit to human life. If the mortality rate for people
aged 100+ settles at some ﬁgure below one, then an inﬁnitely small number of people will live inﬁnitely long. With
a rate of 0.5, only one in a thousand centenarians would reach one hundred and ten, so it is not surprising that the

















































Figure 2: Decennial Changes in Log Mortality Rates: UK Men aged 85-104
will rise indeﬁnitely but simply saying that, for practical purposes one should not assume that the
improvement will stop.
The simplest method of projecting mortality rates is the Lee-Carter method (Lee and
Carter 1992). This provides a structure in which a single factor, which can be modelled as a
time series, is assumed to drive all mortality rates6. The uncertainty surrounding projections then
depends on the uncertainty of the model parameters and the error term in the time series model
for the mortality factor. Lee and Carter (1992) show that, for long-term projections of the type
which concern us here, it is the uncertainty in the error term which dominates. Lee and Miller
(2002) assess the performance of the model out of sample for the Untied States, looking at recursive
forecasts for period (not cohort) life expectancy at birth for men and women combined produced
6The basic model underlying mortality is assumed to be
logm(x,t) = a(x) + b(x)k(t) + ε(x,t)
where m(x,t) is the mortality rate for someone of age x in year t. a(x),b(x) and k(t) are model parameters and ε(x,t)
are error terms. The parameters are estimated to minimise
P
x,t ε2(x,t) subject to the constraints that
P
t k(t) = 0
and
P
x b(x) = 1. Forecasts of mortality rates are produced by forecasts of k outside the sample.
6from 1920 to 1998 and making the assumption that the mortality factor evolves as a random walk
with drift. In the 1920s the median forecasts varied from 70 to 75 as compared to an outturn of
76.7 and an actual life expectancy between 55 and 60 in the 1920s. Despite this good performance,
they acknowledge that the pattern of mortality decline has changed over the period, with declines
in old age being more rapid than declines among young people.
Obviously, with models of this type it is possible also to produce estimates of uncertainty
surrounding projections. However Pensions Commission (2005) considered a range of evidence and
diﬀerent projections for life expectancy, and suggested that, for men aged 65 in 2004 life expectancy
lay in the range 17.6-19.9 years, while for a man aged 19 in 2004 it lay in the range 20-29 years. For
our purpose, of using plausible estimates of mortality uncertainty to simulate a model we regard
these ranges, which the Commission suggests could be seen as representing 90% conﬁdence intervals,
are perfectly adequate.
3 The Decision Framework
Our model structure focuses on two overlapping generations which we refer to as young and old.
Young people are begin their economic life at age 0 and all of them survive to age 1 when they
become old. One period can be thought of as representing forty years. All old people in each
cohort experience a cohort-speciﬁc mortality rate which is independent of age beyond the age of
1, but which is not known with certainty until after they have to make ﬁnancial decisions for the
period starting at age1. The mortality rate in beyond age 1 for cohort i is deﬁned as ρi. The
analysis of conventional annuities presented by Yaari (1965) applies to the old generation with the
qualiﬁcation that at the age of 1 they can buy conventional annuities before their mortality rate is
known. Alternatively they can buy mortality-adjusted annuities whose pay-out depends on their
actual mortality rate once it is established. The interest rate in the model is r and the rate of
discount of future utility is also assumed to be r.
Cohort i faces three decision points in our model.
1. At age 0 young people in cohort, i, receive an endowment of £ 1. They can sell conventional
annuities to old people from cohort i − 1 who have now reached the age of 1. However, they
will choose to do so only at a price which reﬂects the uncertainty surrounding the mortality
of cohort i − 1; the expected mortality rate of cohort i − 1 is ρe
i−1. We denote by πi−1 the
ratio of the actual annuity pay-out to that which would be made by a fair annuity without






. In the absence of uncertainty a fair annuity bought for £1 would yield




r+ρi per £ 1 invested. The expected capital gain is therefore7








Given the pay-out ratio in the market and the uncertainty surrounding the mortality rate of




2. At a time ε after this initial transaction, the actual mortality rate, ρi−1, of the old cohort
becomes known. Given the realisation of ρi−1 and thus the capital gains or losses that young
people from cohort i have made, they choose their consumption rate c
y
i between the ages ε and
1. The assumption that the discount rate equals the interest rate means that this consumption
rate is constant throughout the interval [ε,1].
3. At age 1 cohort i becomes old. It now holds wealth w1
i and has to decide what proportion of
this, φi it wishes to annuitise. It makes this decision in the light of the uncertainty surrounding
its own mortality rate, ρi, and in the face of the market pay-out ratio for conventional annuities,
πi. It buys a mortality-adjusted annuity with its remaining wealth8 giving a yield based on the
as yet unknown mortality rate. This determines the income and consumption of the cohort
when old, co
i.
We assume that ε is small so that we can ignore the consumption which takes place over the
interval [0, ε].





















r − 1) (1)
An old person with wealth w1
i at time 1 who invests a proportion φi in an annuity and the remain-
der in a mortality-adjusted annuity receives a level income of yo
i = {(1 − φi)(r + ρi) + φiπi (r + ρe
i)}w1
i.
Within the conﬁnes of our model, the results of Yaari (1965) and Davidoﬀ, Brown, and Diamond
(2005) imply that old people will invest all of their wealth in one or other of these products; they
7As the arithmetic mean is greater than the harmonic mean for any sequence of positive variables, it follows that
for zero expected capital gain, πi−1 < 1. In other words, an annuity which is fair in the presence of uncertainty
would seem unfair if assessed without taking that uncertainty into account.
8With our assumptions buying a tontine at time 1 is equivalent to buying an annuity at time 1 + ε.
8also imply that, provided the interest rate equals the discount rate, which we assume, these investors
will choose consumption, co
i = yo































The last surviving cohort can sell conventional annuities to its predecessor but it cannot insure
itself against its own longevity risk. For this cohort, cohort T, therefore, φT = 0 and
c
o
T = (r + ρi)w
o
T (4)




















Each consumer has an instantaneous utility function
u(c
z




; z = y or o
Here A is a variable which represents the joy of living and is large enough to ensure that u(cz
i)>0
for all plausible values of cz
i. This condition has to be met for consumers to regard long life as a
good thing rather than a burden but does not inﬂuence utility-maximising decisions..
4 Optimal Allocation
The solution to the model is found recursively. The presence of overlapping generations means that
we have
Looking at the four decision points we work backwards, in common with the backward recursion
used for solving dynamic programming problems. We deﬁne Vi,t as the expected utility of someone
in cohort i at time t on the assumption that they make optimal portfolio and consumption decisions
and that they have a younger cohort with which to trade.






92. At time 1, unless i = T, the consumer has to choose how much wealth to annuitise in order to
maximise expected utility. It is assumed that old people cannot be sellers of either mortality-









0 ≤ φi ≤ 1 E (Vi,1+ε)
=
Max

























We represent the density function of ρi as depending on the values of ρi−1 to take account of
the persistence of mortality rates (See section 5). We stress that the solution is a function of
the annuity pay-out, πi.





















3. At time ε the rate of consumption when young must be chosen. However no new information








































4. At time 0 the consumer must decide how far it is prepared to sell conventional annuities to
the current elderly. πi is unknown because it reﬂects the demand for conventional annuities.
The homotheticity of our utility functions makes clear that this depends on the amount of
wealth that consumers own when they reach age 1, w1
i. This in turn depends on the proﬁts
that they make from selling conventional annuities when aged 0 and thus on the realisation
of ρi−1. φ
0
































































































































is the density function of ρi−1 conditional on the state of knowledge when
cohort i is aged 0, i.e. on ρi−2, and h(πi) is the density function of πi conditional on the same











































In common with empirical work on the topic, we assume that the mortality rate is log-normally




where νi is a normally distributed error term. Following the analysis of section 2 we assume that
νi = νi−1 + υi where υi˜N(γ2,1), Cov(υi,υj) = 0 i 6= j
11Working from ρi−2 which is known with certainty at the time cohort i makes its ﬁrst economic
decisions, this gives
logρi−1 = logρi−2 +
υi−1
δ
logρi = logρi−2 +
υi−1 + υi
δ




= ρi−1. The assumption of log-normality implies
that we can use the Gaussian quadrature to compute expectations when we calculate the optimal
choices.
In this paper we aim to produce a stylised overlapping generations model in order to identify
the equilibrium price of aggregate mortality risk and to do this we make the following simple
assumptions. We assume that life expectancy for men aged sixty-ﬁve is twenty years. For men
aged below sixty-ﬁve the mortality rate is zero while for those aged sixty-ﬁve and over it does not
vary with age; life expectancy at age sixty-ﬁve is therefore given by the reciprocal of the mortality
rate once that is known. Log mortality follows a random walk process. We ignore the issue of drift
although it would obviously be possible to simulate our model with any desired drift. We solve the
model for a succession of periods and, noting that each period represents forty years, consider a








We assume a standard deviation of 0.2, roughly equivalent to a standard deviation in life expectancy








These conditions are met if γ1 = 6.9488 and δ = 10.0249 giving γ2 = 0.0499. However, solution
for the equilibrium pay-out ratio involves considering the eﬀects of a range of diﬀerent initial mor-
tality rates, and in solving for the market-clearing pay-out we therefore use a range of values for
γ1.
The standard deviation of the mortality rate of young men at age twenty-ﬁve is 0.285 giving a
standard deviation of life expectancy of about 2.8 years. If we assume that the preferred Pension
Commission ﬁgures represent 3.3 standard deviations (i.e. are taken from a normal distribution)
then our assumption is a good ﬁt for the mortality uncertainty faced by young men, but overstates
that of old men. To the extent that this is the case, our simulations will overstate the aggregate
mortality risk faced by old people and thus also their desire to protect themselves from it.
126 The Market Solution
We set out here demand and supply curves for conventional annuities.
6.1 The Demand for Annuities
The demand curve for conventional annuities is given as the value of φi which optimises equation
(6). The homotheticity of the utility function implies that this is independent of wo
i. Given our
speciﬁcation of ρi the integral can be evaluated using Gaussian quadrature; we use ﬁve abscissae
with the assumption that νi−1 = 0. The optimum is then found using fminsearch in MATLAB.
However, we note a tendency to over-annuitisation. With πi = 1 we show in appendix A working
to a second-order approximation, that φi = α+1
α . Since this is independent of the magnitude of
V ar(ρi) provided the latter is positive it is due to some fact other than the consequences of the



































r= 1/2% p.a. r=1% p.a. r=1 1/2% p.a. r=2% p.a. r=2 1/2% p.a.
Figure 3: Demand for Annuities: Relative Risk Aversion = 4
The proportionate uncertainty in consumption arising from uncertainty in ρi is decreasing as a
function of r. If the interest rate is low then the overall return on a mortality-adjusted annuity,
13or on funds annuitised at age 1+ε is dominated by ρi; it follows that shocks to ρi will have a large
proportionate impact and people will be keen to buy conventional annuities even if the pay-out is
poor. If r is large, then both ρi and shocks to ρi are likely to be less important. As a consequence,
at any given value of πi < 1 the proportion of w1
i which old people wish to annuitise will be a
declining function of r. We illustrate demand curves for ﬁve values of r between 1
2% p.a. and 21
2%
p.a. in ﬁgure 1. The calculations are carried out on the assumption that an age of 1 represents
forty years, so that r is forty times its annual rate. We use a value of α = 4. This is towards the
upper range of plausible estimates for this value; we choose a value which implies a high degree of
risk aversion because the aim of this paper is, within the framework of a structural model, to look
at the eﬀects of risk aversion on the supply of and demand for conventional annuities.
The curves conﬁrm that the steepness of the demand curve is a function of the interest rate, for
the reasons we discussed above. At low annuity rates it is not surprising that old people would like
to be net sellers rather than net buyers of conventional annuities. But the chart suggests that, for
an annuity market to exist when investors can choose between conventional annuities and mortality-
adjusted annuities, the value of πi cannot be very far below 1. If sellers of conventional annuities
need to make a substantial charge for risk, then there should not be an annuity market, and its
existence can be explained only as a result of the legal requirement for pension funds to be used
to purchase conventional annuities rather than mortality-adjusted annuities. If mortality-adjusted
annuities are not available, the demand curve for conventional annuities is vertical.
6.2 The Supply of Conventional Annuities
While the demand curve for conventional annuities can be drawn unambiguously, the supply curve
depends on the uncertainty that is associated with future pay-out rates. The homotheticity of the
utility function implies that wealth w1
i when reaching age 1 is an increasing function of the proﬁt
realised on the sale of conventional annuities when young. Since the proportion of wealth annuitised
at any pay-out ratio is independent of the amount of wealth, a high level of wealth will raise total
demand for conventional annuities and thus depress the pay-out ratio. Thus the response of the
pay-out ratio dampens, at least to some extent, the eﬀect of uncertain returns from the sale of
conventional annuities, compared to a situation where the pay-out ratio is unresponsive. To clarify
the discussion here, we assume that the annuity pay-out consumers expect when old will be the
same as that used to derive the relationship between current pay-out and supply; in other words
g(πi) = δ(πi − πi−1) where δ(x) is the delta function with δ(x) = 0 if x 6= 0 and
R ∞
−∞ δ(x) = 1,
although when we subsequently solve for the market equilibrium, we take proper account of the role
14of uncertainty in the subsequent pay-out ratio on the supply of annuities.
We ﬁnd again that the steepness of the curve is increasing in the interest rate, showing in
ﬁgure 4 curves constructed when mortality-adjusted annuities are assumed to be available. These
curves once more reﬂect the fact that, with high interest rates mortality risk is quantitatively
less important than with low interest rates. In consequence the proportion of wealth people are
prepared to annuitise rises more steeply as the pay-out on the annuity falls. With a pay-out of
1 young people want to be buyers rather than sellers of conventional annuities (selling a negative
proportion of initial wealth). This is a consequence of the fact that, with uncertainty, the fair
pay-out ratio is below 1. Once again the higher is the interest rate, the less important is mortality
uncertainty and thus the fair pay-out ratio is closer to 1.
When we look at the eﬀects of persistence of mortality shocks we see the rather diﬀerent picture
shown in ﬁgure 4. When young investors lose money because their parents live for longer than
expected, the persistence of mortality rates mean that, in addition they have a longer expected
period of retirement to support. Thus the ﬁnancial eﬀect of losses arising on the sale of conventional
annuities is magniﬁed compared with the situation where mortality rates are independent. It is not
very surprising that the supply curves are both shallower and shifted to the left as compared to the
position where mortality rates are independent. The eﬀect is at its most marked when the interest
rate is very low for the reason identiﬁed earlier. When interest rates are very low the capitalised







































r= 1/2% p.a. r=1% p.a. r=1 1/2% p.a. r=2% p.a. r=2 1/2% p.a.




As with any structural model of demand and supply, we can identify the market-clearing price- in
this case we focus on its reciprocal, the pay-out ratio. We simulate a market-clearing process with
the price adjusting so that the share of old people’s wealth which young people are prepared to
annuitise is equal to the proportion that old people would like annuitised. The reciprocal of the
pay-out ratio can be thought of as the risk premium associated with demographic uncertainty.
The model solution is recursive. We work backwards from the market equilibrium established
when young cohort T sells conventional annuities to old cohort T − 1. Both demand and supply
depend on the mortality of cohort T − 1 and the subsequent mortality of cohort T. These are
in turn stochastic functions of the known mortality rate of cohort T − 2. The market equilibrium
also depends on the wealth of cohort T − 1, w1
T−1 since, this together with the pay-out rate, πT−1
determines the demand for conventional annuities.










where the mortality rates ρT−1 and ρT have to be forecast. The densities of both of these are
determined by ρT−2 which is known. For speciﬁed values of this and w1
T−1 we can iterate to ﬁnd
the market-clearing value of πT−1. We do this for a range of values9 and thus set up a grid showing






We repeat the process for earlier cohorts, noting that the supply of conventional annuities by
young people is, in principle, a function of the uncertain markdown that they expect to have to
face when old. Thus the supply function is
φ
0
i(πi−1,ρi−1,ρi,πi) i < T;
with πi depending on the as yet unknown w1
i−1 and also what is known about the mortality risk
after ρi−1 has been realised.
Equation (8) indicates how w1
i−1 depends on the out-turn for ρi−1 relative to its expectation
conditional on the portfolio choice of the cohort and the value of πi−2. Thus we solve for the
optimum value of φ
0
i in equation (9) using the Gaussian quadrature with, at any given value of
πi−1, the quadrature points of the disturbances to (log) mortality allowing us to evaluate w1
i and πi























Table 1: Market Equilibrium





i < T and thus we can ﬁnd the trajectory of market clearing mark-downs for any given sequence of
mortality shocks.
7.2 Results
As the description of the solution method makes clear, the supply of conventional annuities is in
principle aﬀected by the uncertainty that young people face about the circumstances in which they
will be able to buy annuities in the future. For this reason the market-clearing pay-out ratio on
conventional annuities alters as one approaches the terminal period. We solved the model for eight
periods. We found that, working to four decimal places, while the pay-out ratio diﬀers between the
penultimate period and the ﬁnal period, it does not change any more as one works further back.
Thus the results we present can be regarded as steady state results.
We show our results in table 1 for the case where the real rate of interest is assumed to be 1%
p.a. and α = 4. The choice of a low real interest rate is deliberate since it creates conditions in
which the eﬀects of mortality risk are more likely to be pronounced than if the interest rate were
higher. In the solution we present below cohort i sells conventional annuities to cohort i−1, and the
table shows the market-clearing mark-down on the pay-out in the absence of uncertainty, πi−1, the
propensities to invest in mortality-adjusted annuities when young and when old (φ
0
i and φi−1), and
the expected propensity to consume out of wealth when young, c
y
i. All of these ﬁgures are shown
on the assumption that cohort i − 2 faced its expected aggregate mortality rate of 2 so that, for
cohort i − 1, logρi−1 =
γ1+νi−1
δ where, as deﬁned earlier, νi−1 is normally distributed with mean
-1/2δ and unit standard deviation.
These results point to a market equilibrium in which the mark-down on the annuity rate which
would be observed in the absence of uncertainty is just over 1 1/2%. In equilibrium old people
invest just over half their retirement wealth in conventional annuities.
188 Conclusions
This paper has set out a framework for exploring the issue of aggregate mortality risk by creating
an overlapping generations structure in which young people carry the aggregate mortality risk of
the old people. This creates a natural market and the market-clearing payout on annuities can
therefore be explored. If old people have the choice of carrying some of aggregate mortality risk
for themselves, the demand curve slopes fairly steeply. Even at a very low interest rate demand
for conventional annuities falls to zero once the pay-out ratio drops to 96% of what a fair annuity
would pay out in the absence of risk. Although the supply curve is less steep, it is not surprising
that the market equilibrium is reached without a large charge for aggregate mortality risk. This
suggests that aggregate mortality risk should not be a substantial inﬂuence on observed annuity
rates.
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A Over-annuitisation
It is simple to demonstrate that, in the absence of a risk premium old people tend to over-annuitise.
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> 1 with α > 0
20which is independent of the mortality risk. The result appears to suggest that overannutization
takes place even in the absence of aggregate mortality risk. However if σ2 = 0, then it is of course
not permissible to divide both sides of (10) by σ2. It does, however indicate that with values of πi
close to but below 1 there is likely to be over-annuitisation.
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